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1.  Introduction 
 
According to the classical Gricean approach (Herbert Paul Grice 1989), if a 
speaker utters a sentence such as (1) instead of a (relevant) stronger scalemate 
sentence such as (2), then the listener can infer that the speaker didn’t have 
evidence for (2). 
 
(1) Lucy has two parrots. 
(2) Lucy has three parrots.  
 
Various alternatives to this approach have emerged.  In particular, Gennaro 
Chierchia (2004) argued that scalar implicatures are computed in tandem with the 
semantic computation, but are canceled in Downward Entailing (DE) contexts (or 
whatever context licenses NPIs).  On this approach, scalar implicature 
computation is closely connected to the grammatical system, not part of a general 
reasoning system. 
 The present paper reports the results of a project the larger goal of which 
is to develop a theory of adult language comprehension, including the principles 
determining how, when, and why scalar implicatures are computed.  The issues 
that will be addressed revolve around the issue of whether some pragmatic 
processing is automatic, taking place hand-in-hand with the semantic 
composition.  An issue lurking in the background is the relation between 
strengthening as in (1) and domain widening for an NPI such as ever, since both 
may involve (quasi-) grammatical mechanisms concerned with strengthening an 
utterance relative to competitor utterances.  Chierchia’s approach also highlights 
questions concerning the nature of the contexts in which implicatures tend (not) to 
be drawn.  Are DE contexts important (contexts licensing inferences from sets to 
subsets)?  Are Non-veridical contexts important for implicature computation 
since like DE contexts they may license NPIs (see Anastasia Giannakidou 1998, 
for example)? 
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 The issue of the role of focus in driving implicature computation will also 
be addressed.  Focus activates alternatives (focus values) which, if organized 
from stronger to weaker, form the scale assumed to drive scalar implicatures.  
From psycholinguistic studies, we also know that focus induces deeper processing 
of constituents by determining the allocation of attentional resources.  So, on the 
face of it, focus should be expected to be central to any account of implicature 
processing. 
 Finally, the issue of embedded vs. global implicatures will be addressed.  
Are local implicatures less likely to be computed than global ones?  Although 
they will not be in the foreground of the present discussion, the paper will also 
touch on the issue of how scales are set up and activated, and issues arising due to 
the epistemic states of discourse participants, e.g., whether there are 
knowlegeable speakers, and expert interlocutors. 
 There is a growing psycholinguistic literature on implicature processing in 
adults.  Two positions have received particular attention.  Relevance Theory (Dan 
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson 1986) claims that implicatures are costly to compute 
and are only computed when they are relevant to context. The idea is that 
implicatures are computed when the gain in discourse coherence is sufficient to 
offset the cognitive cost of computing the implicature (see Richard Breheny, 
Napoleon Katsos and John Williams 2006 for one study that has been taken as 
evidence for the position.)  Another approach is the claim that generalized 
implicatures exist (e.g., Stephen Levinson 2000, also Lawrence Horn 1972, 1989, 
1992).  On this view, certain implicatures are computed automatically, though 
they may be canceled in contexts conflicting with the implicature (see Anne 
Bezuidenhout and James Cooper Cutting 2002, Daniel Grodner et al. 2008; also 
Lewis Bott and Ira Noveck 2004, Yi Ting Huang and Jesse Snedecker in progress, 
Ira Noveck and Andres Posada 2003, Ira Noveck et al. 2007.) The existing adult 
processing research will not be discussed in detail here, since it involves 
investigations of non-DE contexts, with the exception of Anna Szabolcsi, Lewis 
Bott and Brian McElree (ms.), who found that an NPI in a DE-context didn’t 
facilitate scalar inferences.   
 In what follows, the results of several experiments will be described.  All 
of the experiments were conducted together with Chuck Clifton.  They were 
inspired by the proposal of Gennaro Chierchia (2004), and the first few were 
conducted together with him.  Before turning to the issue of implicatures per se, it 
should be noted that behind Chierchia’s approach to implicatures is the idea that 
there is a natural language deductive system.  In a surprising way, this dovetails 
with the work of Bart Geurts and Frans van der Silk (2005), who have argued that 
monotonicity may play a special role in interpretation and inference due to the 
simplicity of inferences involving simple substitution of a more or less specific 
term, e.g., substitution of a subset for a set. Based on the accuracy with which 
participants evaluated arguments involving multiple quantifiers, they argued that 
upward monotonic quantifiers and arguments involving harmonic rather than 
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mixed quantifiers (both upward or both downward entailing quantifiers) are less 
complex than downward entailing quantifiers and arguments involving mixed 
quantifiers (one upward and one downward entailing). 
 
 
2.  Montonicity and implicatures 
 
Is it true that listeners and readers are less likely to draw scalar implicatures in DE 
contexts than in non-DE contexts?  To address this question, a one-item test was 
administered to roughly two hundred students at the end of an exam.  They were 
given (3a) or (3b) and asked to complete the example by filling in the blank with 
the first continuation that came to mind, and then to circle a paraphrase of the 
critical phrase in the fragment corresponding to their interpretation. 
 
(3) a. DE: If John has two cars, ______________. 
    exactly two     2 or more    
 
 b. Non-DE: John has two cars._______________. 
    exactly two     2 or more    
 
The strengthened (exactly two) interpretation was chosen 97/109 in the non-DE 
context but chosen significantly less often, 68/107 times, for the DE context (Chi-
square comparing (3a) to (3b) = 17.99, p< .001).  Thus, although the strengthened 
interpretation of two cars predominated in both contexts, the DE context did 
significantly reduce the amount of strengthening. 
 In a written paraphrase selection study, Gennaro Chierchia, Lyn Frazier 
and Charles Clifton (submitted) investigated the interpretation of the sentences in 
(4) to determine whether there was more strengthening of or to an exclusive 
interpretation in non-DE contexts than in DE contexts.  The non-DE contexts are 
illustrated in (4a) and (4b), where or occurs in the predicate of an affirmative 
main clause.  For the DE-contexts or was placed in the antecedent of a 
conditional (4c) or in the first argument of every, as in (4d). 
 
(4) a. Jeremy is a child or foreign. He must fill out a form.  
   (Non-DE:  Simple assertion- 67% Exclusive or) 
 b. If someone must fill out a form, he is a child or foreign.  
   (Non-DE:  Consequent of conditional- 68% Exclusive or) 
 c. If Jeremy is a child or foreign, he must fill out a form. 
   (DE:  Antecedent of conditional- 59% Exclusive or) 
 d. Everyone who is a child or foreign must fill out a form. 
   (DE:  Universal- 42% Exclusive or) 
 
  Is the writer talking about someone.... 
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  ___ who is either a child or foreign, but not both 
  ___ who is a child or foreign or possibly both  
 
As expected, there were fewer strengthened (exclusive or) interpretations in the 
DE contexts than in the non-DE contexts (4a > 4c:  t(47) = 2.35, p < .02; 4b > 4c:  
t(47) = 2.26, p < .03).  The universal example also received fewer strengthened 
interpretations than the conditional (4c > 4d:  t(47) = 5.05, p < .001). 
 The difference between if- and every-sentences was not predicted.  We 
speculated that non-accidental and many-time conditionals may involve less 
strengthening than accidental and one-time conditionals.  Attempts to test this 
experimentally produced mixed results, with only hints that the hypothesis was 
correct (see Appendix A).  So to determine whether there is a genuine difference 
between if and every, we tested examples where the two examples were near 
paraphrases of each other, as in (5) in a written paraphrase selection task. 
 
(5) a. The teacher uses handouts or power point.  He will satisfy the new 
regulations. 
         (53% Exclusive or ) 
 b. If a teacher uses handouts or power point, he will satisfy the new 
regulations.   
         (29 % Exclusive or ) 
 c. Every teacher who uses handouts or power point will satisfy the new 
regulations. 
         (31 % Exclusive or ) 
 
For these examples, there was no difference in the amount of strengthening 
observed for the two DE structures (5b,c).  Further, as expected, both (5b) and 
(5c) showed less strengthening than the non-DE context (5a).  This indicates that 
the difference in examples like those in (5) was not a necessary or inherent 
difference between the two DE contexts. 
 In sum, the present results show that fewer implicatures are drawn in DE 
contexts than in non-DE contexts.  See Danielle Panizza and Gennaro Chierchia 
(in progress) for an eye movement study of Italian sentences showing effects of 
implicatures during the reading of DE and non-DE sentences. 
 
 
3.  DE contexts or any context that licenses NPIs: (Non-) Veridicality 
 
DE contexts license NPIs such as any.  Non-veridical contexts also seem to 
license any (Anastasia Giannakidou 1998).  The question arises, then, as to 
whether fewer implicatures are computed in non-veridical contexts than in 
veridical contexts.  In ERP studies of German, Heiner Drenhaus, Stephen Frisch 
and Doug Saddy (2005) found intermediate effects for non-veridical contexts, 
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specifically for questions relative to negative or affirmative declaratives, when 
they investigated the effects of unlicensed polarity items. 
 In a written paraphrase selection study with Charles Clifton, sentences 
with or without would in the complement were tested, as in (6).  Often the matrix 
verb varied as well (6). 
 
(6) a. Jason imagined that Sue would go to Paris or Rome. 
 b. Jason said that Sue went to Paris or Rome. 
 
The non-veridical sentences received 50% exclusive or responses whereas the 
neridical sentences received slightly more (55% exclusive or).  However, the 
difference was thoroughly non-significant.  The result is surprising given that all 
of the non-veridical examples used in the experiment clearly license any and the 
veridical examples don’t.  The results suggest that there may be a difference 
between the contexts that license NPIs and the contexts that block implicatures 
(though clearly more than a single study is needed to draw any firm conclusions 
on this matter). 
 
 
4.  Focus strengthening hypothesis 
 
Focusing a scalar implicature trigger results in more implicatures being computed 
because computing the focus value of the trigger requires activating alternatives 
to the trigger.  In an auditory paraphrase selection study (Lyn Frazier, Charles 
Clifton and Florian Schwarz in progress), the examples in (7) were recorded with 
a prominent pitch accent on or, or a prominent pitch accent on the auxiliary. 
 
(7) a. Mary will invite Fred OR Sam to the barbecue. 
 b. Mary WILL invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue. 
  
 She will invite Fred or Sam or possibly both; She will invite Fred or Sam 
but not both. 
 
 Forty-eight undergraduate participants listened to the sentences (24 were 
given each list) and selected a paraphrase corresponding to the interpretation they 
assigned to the sentence by pulling a trigger under the selected paraphrase.  The 
results of the study are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of inclusive (and exclusive) choices, and response time (ms) 
   Prop inclusive (exclusive) RT, inclusive  RT, exclusive 
PA on or   .165 (.835)   4048   2942 
PA on auxiliary .286  (.714)   4322   3378   
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The frequency of inclusive (non-strengthened) interpretations was significantly 
reduced by the pitch accent on or (F1(1,47) = 11.59, p < .001; F2(1,15) = 22.67, p 
< .001).  As expected, focus did play a role in triggering implicatures, presumably 
by invoking alternatives.  (See also Arjen Zondervaan this volume). 
 
 
5.  DE context not confounded with focus 
 
The DE contexts in the studies described in Section 2 above included conditionals 
and the first argument of every.  Is it possible that the results of those studies 
suggesting that fewer implicatures are drawn in DE contexts than in non-DE 
contexts are actually due not to the monotonicity properties of the contexts but 
instead due to the fact that the implicature trigger is in a position where 
informational focus is not expected? The extended focus strengthening hypothesis 
(below) might provide an alternative account of the results presented on DE 
contexts. 
 Extended focus strengthening hypothesis: Listeners/readers allocate more 
attention to material in a focused position than material in an unfocused position 
(Anne Cutler and Donald J. Foss 1977, Anne Cutler and Jerry Fodor 1979, Paul 
Hornby 1974, Anthony Sanford and Patrick Sturt 2002), resulting in deeper 
processing of the material in the focused position.  Deeper processing might lead 
to consideration of alternatives and activation of scales. 
 In numerous studies of ellipsis, we have found for example that the choice 
of an inner antecedent for sluicing depends not only on what constituent bears a 
L+H* pitch accent but also on the expected location of informational focus, cf. 
Lyn Frazier and Charles Clifton l998, Katy Carlson, Michael Walsh Dickey, Lyn 
Frazier and Charles Clifton 2008.  Therefore, perhaps in the DE-context studies 
described above readers are responding to expectations about where informational 
focus is expected. 
 To insure that focus alone is not responsible for regulating the 
computation of scalar implicatures, a visual interpretation study was conducted 
(Lyn Frazier, Charles Clifton and Florian Schwarz in progress).  Sentences 
containing disjunctions were tested in affirmative (8a) and negative (8b) forms.  
Affirmative sentences were followed by only two paraphrases, as indicated below 
(8).  By contrast, the paraphrases for the negative sentences included the local 
implicature paraphrase (exclusive or under the scope of negation) in addition to 
the inclusive and exclusive paraphrases.  
 
(8) a. Maria asked Bob to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue. 
 b. Maria asked Bob not to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue. 
  2-choice answer for affirmative; 3-choice for negative. 
         What did Maria ask Bob to do? 
  To invite Fred or Sam,  To invite Fred or Sam, 
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     but not both   possibly both. 
   1    2 
 
To either not invite  To not invite Fred To invite neither or both 
Fred or not invite Sam. and not invite Sam. but not just one. 
 1     2   3 
     ‘Exclusive’   ‘Inclusive’                    ‘Logical/local’ 
 
Table 2 presents the results in terms of proportion of answer 1 choices, as well as 
the raw data. 
 
Table 2.    Frequencies of 1, 2, and 3 answers: 
      1 2 3  
(9a): Proportion 1 =  0.653:  374 190  4 (these 4 are just errors) 
(9b): Proportion 1 =  0.071:    39 494 31 (local implicature answer 
chosen as often as ‘exclusive’ answer) 
 
As expected, there was a large and significant drop in the choice of the exclusive 
(answer 1) interpretation for the negative examples.  Presumably expectations 
about information structure do not differ across the examples and thus the results 
suggest that focus/information structure alone will not suffice to characterize 
when scalar implicatures tend (not) to be drawn.  
 So far, evidence has been presented showing that implicatures are drawn 
less often in DE than in non-DE contexts.  Implicatures are drawn more often 
when the implicature trigger is focused than when it is not.  However, as the last 
study shows, effects of DE contexts are not due to the implicature trigger being 
non-focused (or in syntactic positions where focus is not expected, such as 
antecedents of conditionals or the first argument of every). 
 We turn next to the question of whether scalar implicatures are drawn on-
line, during the processing of a sentence.  To linguists, perhaps it is not clear why 
one should care whether an implicature is drawn during the comprehension of a 
sentence, or at some other point in time.  However, on a Chierchia sort of 
approach, where some pragmatic processing goes hand-in-hand with the semantic 
computation, effects of implicatures are expected even in the absence of 
deliberative post-sentence judgment tasks, or verification tasks.  On the Chierchia 
view, computing a scalar implicature is part of interpreting the sentence and thus 
should not be evidenced only in reasoning tasks or with considered judgments.  
 On a Relevance theory approach, by contrast, implicatures are expected to 
be drawn only when the cost of drawing them is offset by the gain in contextual 
coherence.  By contrast with the predictions of Relevance theory, the evidence 
presented in the present paper suggests that even without specific contextual 
relevance, implicatures tend to get drawn in non-DE contexts.  But one might 
argue that this is due to the nature of the off-line judgment tasks used.  Paraphrase 
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selection may itself encourage readers or listeners to consider the various 
interpretations of the sentence even if they wouldn’t have during a simple 
comprehension task without the paraphrase selection task.  
 A study where participants simply read sentences for comprehension 
could address this issue. To this end, a self-paced reading experiment was 
conducted (Lyn Frazier, Charles Clifton and Florian Schwarz in progress).  The 
or sentences in affirmative/negative contexts tested in the paraphrase selection 
task (8) were followed by either a continuation strongly favoring an exclusive 
reading or a neutral sentence (which was neutral or weakly biased to the 
inclusive). Assuming readers tend to draw implicatures in non-DE contexts but 
tend not to draw them in DE contexts, an interaction was predicted with 
advantage for Continuation 1 (relative to Continuation 2) greater in the 
affirmatives than in the negatives.  Caution:  The continuation sentences differ 
from each other in multiple ways that might influence their reading times, so it is 
only the size of the difference between the two continuations in the affirmative 
context vs. in the negative context that can be interpreted.  Examples are given in 
(9). 
 
(9) a. Maria asked Bob to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue.  She didn’t 
have enough room to invite both. (Strongly biased to exclusive) 
 b. Maria asked Bob to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue.  It’s the first 
time she’s ever cooked outside. (Neutral/Weak bias to inclusive ) 
 c. Maria asked Bob not to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue. She didn’t 
have enough room to invite both. (Strongly biased to exclusive) 
 d. Maria asked Bob not to invite Fred or Sam to the barbecue.  It’s the 
first time she’s ever cooked outside. (Neutral/Weak bias to 
inclusive) 
 
The results are presented in Table 3.  As expected the difference in reading time 
between the two continuations was larger for the affirmative sentences than for 
the negative sentences. 
 
Table 3.          Reading time in ms. for Sentence 2 
   Aff Continuation1:  1696-Contin. 1 is fast relative to Contin. 2 (-209 ms.) 
   Aff Continuation 2:  1905 
   Neg Continuation1:  1767-Contin. 1 is not fast relative to Contin. 2 (-39 ms.) 
   Neg Continuation 2: 1806 
 
The mean reading times of Sentence 2 are of particular interest. Continuation 2 
was read more slowly than Continuation 1 (F1(1, 47) = 6.4, p < .02, but this 
difference has no clear interpretation because of the lexical differences between 
the continuations. Of more interest, the interaction between sentence version and 
continuation was marginally significant (F1(1, 47) = 3.22, p < .08.  Given the 
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marginality of the critical interaction, we take the result to be interesting and 
suggestive, but certainly not conclusive.  (There were differences among the 
Continuation 2 items.  In addition, the effect seemed to be sensitive to the 
particular cutoff used for long reading times.  Therefore, we are currently 
pursuing this finding with more tightly controlled materials.)  Nevertheless, the 
results do point in the direction of scalar implicatures being drawn during a 
simple reading task, without any need for a deliberative judgment. 
 In a self-paced reading study, Gennaro Chierchia, Lyn Frazier and Charles 
Clifton (submitted) tested conditional and universal sentences followed by 
continuations biased to a non-strengthened (two or more) interpretation, as in 
(10a,c, 11a,c)  or a strengthened (exactly two) interpretation of cardinals, as in 
(10bd, 11b,d). 
 
(10) a. If John has two cars,/then I guess that he must be quite rich.  
 b. If John has two cars,/then the VW outside must belong to someone 
else.(from Stephen Levinson, 2000) 
 c. John has two cars./I guess that he must be quite rich. 
 d. John has two cars. The VW outside must belong to someone else. 
(11) a. Every girl who has three brothers/is a tomboy. 
 b. Every girl who has three brothers/dreads having four brothers. 
 c. The girl has three brothers./She is a tomboy. 
 d. The girl has three brothers./She dreads having a fourth one. 
 
Table 4: Mean reading times (ms), second presentation region when context 
permitted/ or forced a strengthened interpreation. 
     (N or more)  (Exactly N)    Difference  
Conditional Items 
Conditional/Quantified  1839 (a)  2370 (b) 531 
Simple     1764 (c)  2146 (d)  382 
 
Quantified Items 
Conditional/Quantified  1476 (a)  1865 (b) 389 
Simple     1767 (c)  1916 (d) 149 
 
All Items 
Conditional/Quantified  1658 (a)  2118 (b) 460 
Simple     1766 (c)  2030 (d) 264 
 
The results of the experiment revealed two effects. Sentences disambiguated to 
their strengthened interpretation took longer to read than their counterparts 
disambiguated to their basic meaning. This finding cannot be interpreted since 
different material was read in the two cases. The second finding was the 
interaction of DE vs. non-DE context by disambiguation type. The interaction 
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between simple (non-DE) and Conditional/Quantified (DE) and continuation was 
significant (F1(1,47) = 5.73, p < 02; F2(1,21) = 4.61, p < .04).  As predicted, the 
disambiguation toward the strengthened interpretation increased reading times 
more for the DE context sentences than the non-DE sentences. 
 The results of the self-paced reading studies suggest that differential 
strengthening effects for DE vs. non-DE contexts can be seen on-line. 
 
 
6.  Embedded implicatures 
 
6.1 Embedded versus local implicatures 
 
Classic Gricean reasoning produces global implicatures, involving the negation of 
competitors to entire utterances, as in (12b).  Global implicatures are weaker than 
local implicatures, which result from negation of competitors to proper subparts 
of an utterance, as in (12a). 
 
(12) George believes some of his advisors are crooks. (Gennaro Chierchia, 
2004, Benjamin Russell, 2006) 
 a. George believes not all of his advisors are crooks. 
   (Local/Embedded implicature) 
b. It’s not the case that George believes all of his advisors are crooks. 
  (Global implicature) 
 
Nausiccaa Pouscoulous and Bart Geurts (2007) investigated whether perceivers 
compute embedded implicatures in three experiments, two in French and one in 
Dutch.  In their first experiment (see Appendix B for a description of the others),   
participants saw the sentences in (13). Participants had to indicate whether or not 
they would endorse the inference provided.  On a localist view, where embedded 
implicatures are regularly computed, all of them should go through.  On a classic 
Gricean view, only (13a) should. 
 
(13) a. Jack read some of the Harry Potter books => He didn’t read all of 
them. (Control) 
 b. All of the students read some of the Harry Potter books.=> None of 
them read them all. 
 c. Jack has to read some of the Harry Potter books.=> He isn’t allowed to 
read them all. 
 d. Jill thinks that Jack read some of the Harry Potter books.=> She thinks 
he didn’t read them all. 
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The results revealed an endorsement rate of 93% for the control, 27% for all, 3% 
for must, 50% for think.  As expected by the investigators, the endorsement rate 
dropped dramatically for the embedded implicatures in (13b-d). 
 To determine whether there would be a comparable drop in the number of  
implicatures in embedded contexts in English, I conducted a small pilot study 
testing two lexicalizations of each of the structures in (13) in a written paraphrase 
selection study.  Based on my own intuitions, I expected more embedded 
implicatures in English than Pouscoulous and Geurts had found.  Further, the pilot 
was designed to examine whether any drop in the implicatures drawn in 
embedded contexts might be related to implicit prosody.  Greater prominence 
might be placed on some in the control (13a) than in the embedded examples 
(13b-d).  (Alternatively, the probability of placing a prominent accent early in the 
sentence, before the direct object, might be greater in (13b-d) than in (13a)). 
 15 participants were tested.  The experimental sentences were divided into 
three lists.  On one, none of the experimental items had a capitalized word, though 
some of the fillers did. On the other two lists, each sentence appeared once and it 
contained a capitalized word; the capitalized word was either some or a word 
earlier in the sentence (all, has, thinks, or, in (13a), Jack), counterbalanced across 
lists so that half the experimental sentences a participant saw had SOME and half 
had some.  Participants were instructed that capitalized words would be spoken 
with stress.  The materials are illustrated in (14) and (15). 
 
(14) JACK read some of the Harry Potter books. (JACK/SOME) 
 __Jack read some but not all of the HP books   
 __Jack read at least some of the HP books 
 
(15) All of the students wrote SOME of the official memos. (ALL/SOME) 
 __All of the students wrote some but not all of the official memos 
 __All of the students wrote at least some of the official memos 
 
The results of the pilot study are presented in Table 5, where the lefthand column 
summarizes the Nausicaa Pouscoulous and Bart Geurts results, the middle column 
reports the sum for all items in the pilot study, and the rightmost column reports 
the results for just List 1 where no experimental item was capitalized. 
 
Table 5.  Percent strengthened interpretations in the pilot study. 
    P&G Pilot Pilot-List 1(=no stress)  
 Control 93% 76% 90% 
 ALL  27% 69% 80% 
 MUST  3% 59% 50% 
 THINK 50% 59% 70% 
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If the pilot data are representative, there are more local implicatures in English 
than Nausicaa Pouscoulous and Bart Geurts might expect.  Overall (see the 
middle column of Table 5), there were at least 59% strengthened interpretations 
in all contexts, including the embedded ones.  This supports the intuition that in 
English, at least, embedded implicatures are computed fairly often. The implicit 
prosody hypothesis, which predicted more strengthening when some was 
capitalized than when it was not, wasn’t generally supported in the pilot data.1  
There may well have been implicit prosody effects, but they were not general, and 
the specific effects suggested by the data will be taken up below in full scale 
studies (and thus not addressed here). 
 Before leaving the pilot study, it should be noted that one of the filler 
items in the pilot was included in order to examine a prediction of the idea that 
the amount of strengthening of one implicature trigger versus another in any 
given context may be a function in part of how salient and stable the alternatives 
to that trigger are.  For cardinals, they are highly salient and stable.  As children, 
we learned numbers together with their alternatives by reciting one, two, three, 
etc. Intuitions suggest that cardinal numbers typically show more strengthening 
than other implicature triggers.  To test the idea that strengthening, computing 
scalar implicatures, is highly likely with a salient stable scale, the pilot included 
the items in (16).  The idea was that, like cardinals, we learn the letters of the 
alphabet together with their alternatives, reciting them as a, b, c, etc.  Thus, if the 
existence of salient stable alternatives makes the strengthening of an implicature 
trigger highly likely, we would expect lots of interpretations of (16) as “G and no 
farther.” 
 
(16) Susie says/can say/CAN say the alphabet to “G”. 
 
(16') __ Susie can say the alphabet to “G,” but no farther 
 __ Susie can say the alphabet to “G,” and possibly farther 
 
Indeed, 12 out of 15 responses to (16) indicated that participants strengthened 
(16).  This is at least suggestive support for the role of salient stable alternatives 
in regulating the (baseline) amount of strengthening associated with a particular 
implicature trigger. 
 
6.2 Embedding implicatures under has/must 
 
We turn next to the effect of an embedding verb on pragmatic strengthening 
processes.  HAS/MUST may be assumed to impose a requirement in sentences like 
                                                 
1The effect of capitalzation may have had an effect throughout the experiment (diminishing 
s’m).  I don’t think the capitalization was totally ineffective.  For Jenny watched tennis or 
volleyball 5/10 responses were exclusive, whereas with OR 5/5 were exclusive, for example. 
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(17). Consequently it may bias readers to a lower bounded interpretation since 
requirements usually impose a criterion which must be met and may be exceeded.  
This bias rather than embedding per se might lead us to expect somewhat fewer 
strengthened interpretations in (17b) than in (17a).  (17d) with explicit focus on 
HAS/MUST should show substantially fewer strengthened interpretations than 
(17a-c), on the assumption that it is the bias of the verb rather than embedding per 
se which influences pragmatic strengthening.  This expectation was tested in a 
written paraphrase selection task, using materials like those in (17). 
 
(17) a. Patrick weeded some of the gardens. 
 b. Patrick has to weed some of the gardens  
 c. Patrick has to weed SOME of the gardens. 
 d. Patrick HAS to weed some of the gardens. 
 
Question: What does Patrick (have to) weed? 
 1. Some of the gardens but not all of them. 
 2. Some of the gardens and possibly all of them. 
 
The results are presented in (17').  As expected the presence of has together with 
emphasis on has (HAS), resulted in a significant drop in strengthening.  The mere 
presence of has resulted in only a small (and not fully significant) drop in 
strengthening. 
 
(17') a: 84.7% strengthened 
 b: 78.1% strengthened 
 c: 80.6% strengthened 
 d: 66.7% strengthened 
 
Thus, has may impose a bias toward fewer implicatures when it imposes a 
requirement. 
 
6.3  Embedding implicatures under Thinks vs Knows 
 
A written interpretation study compared think and know as the embedding 
predicates. The assumption that (informational) focus is expected at the end of the 
sentence would lead us to expect substantial strengthening in (18a,c).  When 
thinks/knows is capitalized, presumably alternatives will be activated which may 
be ordered on a certainty scale, with know at the top of the scale perhaps with is 
certain/can prove and think presumably lower on the certainty scale but not as 
low as guess.  (Of course other alternatives might also be possible for know – an 
issue that will be set aside for the present.)  Given these assumptions, know may 
impose a bias for a lower bounded interpretations, like vouch for, because being 
certain about x does not imply being certain about something stronger than x. 
COMPUTING SCALAR IMPLICATURES 331
(Essentially this explanation was given by one participant in the pilot experiment 
who received the capitalized KNOW condition.)  With respect to thinks/THINKS, 
several possibilities exist.  Perhaps the most interesting is that, because thinks is 
intermediate on a scale of certainty (from guesses to knows/is certain), perhaps 
emphasizing thinks will not dramatically change the amount of strengthening, 
since the perceiver will not know what aspect of thinks is being emphasized – that 
the speaker is certain to some positive degree, or that the speaker is not certain. 
 
(18) a. Rob thinks Laura saw some of the James Bond movies. 
 b. Rob THINKS Laura saw some of the James Bond movies. 
 c. Rob knows Laura saw some of the James Bond movies. 
 d. Rob KNOWS Laura saw some of the James Bond movies. 
 
Question:   That sentence was about Laura seeing 
 1.  some of the James Bond movies but not all of them. 
 2.  some of the James Bond movies and possibly all of them. 
 
(18') Proportion of strengthened readings: 
 (19a) 0.75%  
 (19b) 0.74% 
 (19c) 0.74% 
 (19d) 0.66% 
 
The results are summarized in (18'): Sentence (18d) received significantly fewer 
strengthened interpretations than the other three sentences, which did not differ 
from each other.  Sentences (18a,c and d) behaved as expected.  (18b) THINKS 
behaved like the uncapitalized thinks/knows conditions, perhaps suggesting that 
its presumed intermediate position on a certainty scale leaves it without a strong 
bias in our sentences. 
 
 
7.  Local vs. global computations 
 
We turn now to a study of the domain widening NPI ever.  On the face of it, 
domain wideners are related to strengthening in two respects.  First, domain 
widening IS a form of strengthening – one that requires even exceptional 
members of the domain to be taken into account.  Second, domain wideners are 
sensitive to the monotonicity of their contexts, as is strengthening in general.  In 
the study to be reported, ever was placed in a garden path sentence to determine 
whether the monotonicity properties of a temporary syntactic analysis influence 
the processing of a sentence.  On a view where only global computations of 
monotonicy are computed, only the monotonicity of the ultimately correct 
syntactic structure would be expected to matter.  On a localist view of implicature 
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computation, the monotonicity of the temporary (garden-path) analysis might be 
expected to exert an influence on the processing of the sentence. 
 The garden-path structure that will be used is the same as the famous 
garden-path in (19) (originally due to Thomas Bever).  In these structures, The 
horse raced past the barn is analyzed as a simple main clause until the tensed 
verb fell is encountered.  Then the first syntactic analysis must be reanalyzed to 
produce a subject phrase containing a reduced relative clause. 
 
(19) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
 
If NPIs such as ever are licensed semantically by DE contexts and monotonicity 
computations come into play only in terms of the global context of the entire 
utterance, then a garden-path in the syntactic analysis shouldn’t influence the 
processing of an NPI in the garden-path sentence.  The nature of the context, DE 
for the relative clause or non-DE for the main clause, should be computed with 
respect to the final syntactic analysis of the sentence.  On a local approach, or a 
syntactic approach, one might expect difficulties if an NPI (a domain widener like 
ever) appeared to be unlicensed on the first syntactic analysis of the sentence.   
 In short, strings like A teacher caught... are known to be parsed initially as 
main clause structures (non-DE).  Thus a localist approach, which must keep 
track of monotonicity during the processing of the sentence, might lead us to 
expect (20b) to be difficult or odd because the NPI ever will at first appear not to 
be licensed, i.e., before the syntactic garden-path is reanalyzed.  This prediction 
was tested in a written acceptability judgment study with Charles Clifton, using a 
5 point scale.  The study tested materials like those in (21/22).  Examples with 
disambiguated relative clause structures served as controls (21/22c and d).  A 
localist view predicts an oddity in the reduced relative clause forms when they 
contain ever.  By contrast, in the full relative clause forms, the processor knows 
that the structure is a relative clause (DE) before encountering ever.  So ever 
should not appear to be unlicensed in the full relative clause examples. 
 
(20) a. A teacher caught with communist literature won’t be allowed to teach 
Social Studies. 
 b. A teacher ever caught with communist literature won’t be allowed to 
teach Social Studies. 
 
(21) a. [sing, RRC no ever] A man arrested in this country won’t break 
the law here again. 
 b. [sing, RRC ever]  A man ever arrested in this country won’t 
break the law here again. 
 c. [sing, FRC, no ever] A man who was arrested in this country 
won’t break the law here again. 
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 d. [sing, FRC, ever]  A man who was ever arrested in this country 
won’t break the law here again. 
 
(22) a. [pl, RRC, no ever]  Men arrested in this country won’t break the 
law here again. 
 b. [pl, RRC, ever]  Men ever arrested in this country won’t 
break the law here again. 
 c.  [pl, FRC, no ever] Men arrested in this country won’t break the 
law here again. 
 d. [pl, FRC, ever]  Men ever arrested in this country won’t 
break the law here again. 
 
The results appear below in terms of mean acceptability (5 = good).  The Reduced 
Relative Clause (RRC) was rated worse than the Full Relative Clause (FRC), 
examples containing ever were rated worse than examples without ever.  As 
predicted there was an interaction of ever and full/reduced RC, with the lowest 
ratings being the reduced relative ever forms.  
 
Singular: 3.88 - RRC no ever 
   3.16 - RRC ever 
   4.00 - FRC no ever 
   3.62 - FRC ever 
 
Plurals:  3.68 - RRC no ever 
  3.04 - RRC ever 
  3.96 - FRC no ever 
  3.84 - FRC ever 
 
The results thus suggest a localist view.  Monotonicity properties associated with 
a temporary syntactic analysis of a sentence influence the processing of a 
sentence.  This is difficult to reconcile with an approach where monotonicity 
comes into play only in terms of the global utterance. 
 
 
8.  Summary and Possible Implications 
 
The main results of the paper may be summarized easily: 
 
! DE contexts give rise to fewer scalar implicatures than their non-DE 
counterparts  
! Effects of DE vs non-DE contexts show up online (in the self-paced 
reading studies, ever-study) 
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! No reliable support was found for fewer implicatures in non-veridical 
contexts than veridical ones 
! Focusing a scalar implicature trigger increases the number of implicatures 
(presumably by activating the alternatives that form a scale) 
! DE effects are not due to a focus confound 
! The paucity of embedded implicatures in Pouscoulous and Geurts does not 
carry over to English 
! Effects of epistemic knowledge and focus interact (focusing a 
propositional attitude verb invokes a scale of certainty, apparently yielding 
a lower-bounded interpretation for knows; focus appears to interact 
differently with implicature triggers that are intermediate on their scale 
and with those that are at or near endpoints). 
  Overall the results support Chierchia’s proposal, though it needn’t be 
implemented in terms of computing and then canceling implicatures in contexts 
known to be DE.  More work must be done to determine whether the effect of DE 
contexts is to inhibit the drawing of implicatures in the first place, or to cancel 
implicatures that have been drawn.  Similarly strengthening was not completely 
absent in DE contexts.  To a psycholinguist, this is perhaps less surprising than it 
might be to a semanticist.  Sentences have an indefinite number of properties.  
Participants in a study, even those paying full attention, may not be responding to 
the properties of interest to the experimenter and participants may be imagining 
different scenarios from those intended by the experimenter.  Thus, studies like 
those reported here do not necessarily provide an accurate estimate of the absolute 
number of implicatures drawn.  Rather, it is the relation between conditions that 
may be interpreted securely.  
 Focus activates alternatives. Differences among implicature triggers are 
plausibly due to how stable and salient their alternatives are (highly stable for 
numbers and letters of the alphabet, less stable for some).  Both numbers and 
other triggers yield fewer implicatures in DE contexts than non-DE contexts.  
Further, the evidence that the monotonicity properties of sentences are computed 
locally as the parse develops fits well with the idea that some pragmatic 
processing is automatic, highly structured by the linguistic system, and not strictly 
global. 
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Appendix 
 
 
A. One time vs. Many time conditionals: Tense  
In a written questionnaire study, 48 participants were asked to choose 
paraphrases:   
 
(i) a. If John has ten dollars, he’ll go to NY for the weekend. Strengthened 
55% 
 b. If John had ten dollars, he went to NY for the weekend. Strengthened 
46% 
 
(ii) a. If Sue takes band or a swimming class, she’ll be happy. Strengthened 
30% 
 b. If Sue took band or a swimming class, she was happy. Strengthened 
29% 
 
There was no significant effect of tense. 
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One time vs Many time conditionals: DP-type 
 In a one item written interpretation study: 
 
(iii) a. If someone takes art classes or does karate, she’ll be happy.   
       51 exclusive; 61 inclusive 
 b. If Beth takes art classes or does karate, she’ll be happy.         
       38 exclusive; 72 inclusive     
 (Chi-square = 2.79, p < .10) 
 
The studies summarized above suggest there isn’t a robust general effect of many-
time conditionals behaving more like every than one time conditionals. 
 
B. Pouscoulous and Geurts: Experiments 2 and 3 
Pouscoulous and Geurts’ Experiment 2 examined distinct matrix verbs: 
 
(i) a. Jill thinks that Jack read some of the Harry Potter books. => She 
thinks he didn’t read them all.  (Thinks) 
 b. Jill wants Jack to read some of the Harry Potter books. => She wants 
him not to read them all.  (Wants) 
 
The results indicated a 65% endorsement rate for thinks, and a 32% endorsement 
rate for wants. The control yielded a 94% endorsement rate.  
 
They addressed the question of whether the high rate of endorsement for thinks 
could be evidence for a weakened localist position? They concluded that it could 
not and note that Russell,2006 shows how a Gricean account can deal with 
semingly localist inferences in belief sentences. They also argue that the “overall 
level of positive responses in our first two studies is inflated by the exeprimental 
paradigm.” 
 
 
Experiment 3 was designed to show that the methodology used in Experiments 1 
and 2 inflated the true endorsement rate.  To show this presumed inflation, they 
compared the results of the inference task used above, testing (iii), to results for 
the same sentence where participants have to decide if (iii) is true of a situation 
(ii): 
(ii)              
  B B B C C C     A A A  
 
 
(iii)  Some of the B’s are in the box on the left. 
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Inference in Experiments 1,2: 62% endorse not all 
Inference in Experiment. 3: 34% reject (ii) as applied to ( i) 
 
 
C. Domain widening ever 
Several predictions of our account of the oddity of ever in reduced relative 
clauses have not yet been tested.  One prediction is that the effect should 
disappear when the head of the reduced relative is no man as in (i), since in this 
case ever should be licensed in either the main clause or the reduced relative 
syntactic structure. 
 
(i) No man ever arrested in this country will break the law here again.   
 
 Another issue concerns the role of the PPI ever.  Consider a fully 
ambiguous sentence like (ii), which can mean “A woman who was once happy 
with her marriage...” or “A woman, always happy with her marriage,...” 
 
(ii) A woman ever happy with her marriage will find divorce difficult to 
contemplate. 
 a. NPI ever: A woman who was ever happy with her marriage... 
 b. PPI ever: A woman, ever happy with her marriage, ... 
 
The ‘generic’ property of a relative clause presumably sets up a Downward 
Entailing (DE) context that licenses the NPI ever (cf. *The police ever arrested a 
man in this country. but If the police ever arrested a man in this country, he 
should have been offered a lawyer.).  In our reduced relative clause test sentences, 
ever may at first appear to be unlicensed before the relative clause structure is 
postulated.  Perhaps as a result, the processor considers the possibility that ever is 
a PPI that widens the domain in positive contexts, yielding an interpretation like 
that of always. This may exacerbate the difficulty with these examples. 
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